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Abstract. Debates on global climate change (GCC) have been heavily influenced
by such factors as scientific evidence, media coverage, public concerns, partisan
interest, and so forth. Focusing on the linkages among the congressional
committees, hearings, and invited witnesses (and their sectors), this study
investigates the relational conditions under which congressional committees have
mobilized climate expertise to discuss climate change issues for the past decades
in U.S. Congress. Our findings show that agenda setting and witness selection by
the committees significantly differed across the party lines: more environmental
scientists were invited to define GCC as a threat in Democratic Congresses,
whereas industrial scientists, to search for solutions in Republican Congresses.
Except for a few proactive committees, committee jurisdiction was limitedly
exercised. Our findings presents strong evidence along which climate policy
debates have been framed based on a biased input of climate expertise.
Keywords: Climate change, mobilization, framing, committee, hearing, climate
policy, Congress

Of various environmental issues, climate change is one of the most debated issues in recent
decades. The debate has included not only domestic policymakers, (climate, social) scientists,
and industry leaders but inter/transnational actors shown in efforts such as the Kyoto Protocol
and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2001). Over time, there has been
growing consensus (regarding human dimensions) on the causes, processes, and consequences of
climate change in the science and policy communities (Alley 2000, Mayewski and White 2002,
NRC/NAS 1992, 1994, 1999, Oreskes 2004b, Rosa et al. 2004, Rosa et al. 2007, Stern and
Wilbanks 2008, York et al. 2003a, 2003b). As is typical of other sources of modern risk (Beck
[1986] 1992, Giddens 1990, 1999, Perrow [1984] 1999), however, climate change involves
causes, processes, and consequences that might not be fully known. Further, despite a growing
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consensus, both conflicting evidence utilized and oppositional claims made in the science and
policy communities have kept collective efforts to mitigate from moving forward.
Effective policy debate and policymaking, however, along with grassroots activism and
civic engagement, are important because they can facilitate collective societal efforts to be
enforced to mitigate climate change. Indeed, for decades U.S. Congress has been a pivotal policy
arena in which climate science, sector capacity, and policymaking have been intertwined forging
national climate policies. Investigating the ways in which they have been linked in the climate
debate will allow us to better understand the climate policy process and outcomes in recent
decades in the United States. Yet, except for a few studies and their findings (Anderson 2002,
Brown 1997, Stallworthy 2009), little is empirically studied regarding the conditions under
which Congress has affected national climate change debates and policies. Furthermore, even the
studies above did not pay adequate attention to the structural-relational dimensions in the
institutional environment that have defined the contents of the climate debate in Congress, which
we believe enabled framing of climate policy debates for the past decades.
In this study, we investigate the conditions under which climate change and policy
options were debated in Congress from 1976 to 2007 in an attempt to uncover the linkages that
potentially facilitated framing of climate policy debates. Analyzing these linkages will
demonstrate the ways that policymakers mobilized resources such as climate science from
societal sectors to frame the climate debate. Analyses are done in two steps: First, we aim to
reveal the characteristics of the interconnectedness among the forces that influence the climate
debate including partisan interests, committee jurisdictions, and sector priorities (or input) for the
given period. Second, we discuss the implications of the structural-relational characteristics of
the “policy network” for framing the climate debate and policy outcomes (for general
discussions of policy networks, see Knoke 1990, Knoke et al. 1996).
Scientific Uncertainty and Climate Debates
Science has allowed societies to achieve specific goals by supplying knowledge and information
(Sarewitz and Pielke 2007). Nonetheless, scientific evidence is frequently thought to be uncertain
in public policy debates on controversial issues such as climate change. The literature points out
two different reasons behind scientific uncertainty: First, as Oreskes (2004a:369-370) claims,
“[S]cience does not produce logically indisputable proofs about the natural world. At best, it
produces a robust consensus based on a process of inquiry that allows for continued scrutiny, reexamination, and revision.” Thus, competing evidence and disagreements are unavoidable within
the scientific community resulting in a lack of coherence and a conflict when the issues of
interest become salient. Second, science cannot warrant certainty about the matters of interest
because scientific uncertainty is amplified as contesting parties in disputes use their own bodies
of legitimated facts (Fischer 1990, Herrick and Sarewitz 2000, Sarewitz 2004).
The second source of scientific uncertainty presented above is particularly important in
understanding the relationship between environmental science and policymaking. As Levy and
Rothenberg (2002:173) argued, “collective interpretations about the nature and solutions to
climate change” are “molded and contested within institutional fields” including industry
associations, universities, the media, and national and international governance structures, and
these collective interpretations constitute the scientific, policy, and industry responses. Similarly,
Gough and Shackley (2001) focuses on the establishment of an epistemic community that brings
together a broad array of actors and how its members construct the problem, objectives, core
2

beliefs, and responses to climate change. Importantly, the possibility that policy actors influence
scientific certainty based on their collective interpretations and interests, is open to all policy
communities regardless of their types and ideologies.
Several empirical studies have demonstrated the processes by which these collective
interpretations, interests, and efforts have attempted to influence the climate policy debate. For
example, McCright and Dunlap (2000, 2003) examine the counter-claims to construct the “nonproblematicity” of global warming to challenge the global warming claims of mainstream
climate science, which was largely promoted by the conservative movement including
conservative foundations, conservative think tanks, and sympathetic skeptic scientists (also see
UCS 2004a, 2004b). Others examine climate policy responses and strategies by the industries in
an attempt to negotiate national and international climate change policies (Levy and Egan 1998,
Pulver 2007). Brown (1997) introduces conservative claims that scientific communities
exaggerate scientific certainty and consensus on environmental problems and that the
bureaucrats use these statements for stringent regulations and funding for these scientific
communities (see Oreskes 2004b for the scientific consensus on climate change).
Given the relationship between science and policy presented in the literature
(Collingridge and Reeve 1986, Guston 2003, Jasanoff 1990, 1996, Kuehn and Porter 1981), a
key to understanding climate policy process and outcomes is to investigate how policy actors that
are mostly aggregated collectivities such as organizations and sectors use scientific evidence as a
type of political resource in policy debates. Investigating the linkages among the policy actors,
science, and political events such as congressional hearings allows us to better understand the
conditions under which the climate policy debate can be framed due to the dominant actors or
dominant patterns of utilization of science (for discussions of “frame” analysis and its emphasis
on symbolic processes and discourse in collective behavior, see Snow et al. 1986, Benford 1997).
Despite the pivotal role of Congress in national and international policy processes (Wilson 1956,
Krehbiel 1991, Dion 1992), specific conditions under which policy actors (committees,
witnesses) have used scientific evidence on climate change to advance the agenda toward
achieving their goals have largely been understudied.
As presented in several studies, policy debates in Congress provide policy communities
with not only facts regarding the issues of interest but symbolic outputs including heightened
public attention, which will influence drafting of legislation (Burstein and Bricher 1997, Burstein
et al. 1995, Johns et al. 1993). In particular, we note two different sources that may influence the
climate policy debate in Congress: Committees (including committee members’ party
identification and oversight jurisdiction) and societal sectors. As Burstein and associates noted,
congressional committees are influential because the ways they define a problem, for example,
sets the stage for further legislative action (Burstein et al. 1995, Burstein and Bricher 1997).
Similarly, while explaining the dynamics of jurisdictional control, Jones et al. (1993) observed
significant issue bias by the committees and yet the level of jurisdictional monopoly controlled
as new committees claimed jurisdiction over issues. In addition to the committees, societal
sectors from which witnesses are invited for input attempt to define and frame issues of interest,
leaving open the possibility that political resources such as scientific evidence are selectively
mobilized. Thus, the section below presents a structural-relational framework to analyze the
mobilizing patterns of scientific and non-scientific expertise on climate change in prioritizing
issues, defining problems, and finding viable solutions in the climate policy debate in Congress.
3

Mobilizing Science in Climate Debates
Contemporary theories of collective sociopolitical behavior such as that of policy actors
emphasize the actors’ ability to acquire and mobilize political resources to advance their political
goals (Diani and McAdam 2003, Tilly 1978, also see models of public policymaking in Birkland
2005). The importance of the access to and control over political resources has been evidenced in
collective activities including creating organizational structures, capturing media’s attention, and
forming alliances, which have been increasingly found in recent policy processes, collective
action, and social movements (Kübler 2001, McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977, Zald and McCarthy
1987). Thus, as discussed above, addressing the relationship between science and the climate
policy debate in Congress necessitates an investigation of the mobilizing patterns of scientific
(and non-scientific) expertise on climate change in prioritizing issues, defining problems, and
finding viable solutions.
There have been noticeable developments in the 1990s in attempts to investigate
mobilizing structures in policy processes focusing on the connectedness among the policy
constituents (actors, resources, events, etc.). For example, Knoke and associates (Knoke 1990,
Knoke et al. 1996) represented and analyzed political and policy communities as networks:
Knoke (1990) studied political systems as political networks based on the assumption that the
most important element of political power is the relationship of influence and domination among
social actors. Knoke et al. (1996:6) investigate policy networks that “link heterogeneous
communities of policy actors into intricate webs of common benefit-seeking actions” (also see
Heclo 1978, Katzenstein 1978, Laumann and Knoke 1987, Marin and Mayntz 1991, Wilks and
Wright 1987).
Since then, more efforts have been made to integrate policy process theories and policy
network approaches. Attempting to advance the Sabatier’s (1993, 2007) Advocacy Coalition
Framework (ACF), Fenger and Klok (2001) demonstrate that attention for interdependency
significantly contributes to explaining the behavior of policy actors and advocacy coalitions. In a
managerial orientation, Klijn and Koppenjan (2004) address risk and uncertainty using the
concept of network strategy developed based on the Kingdon’s (1984) Stream Model and the
Sabatier’s ACF. Recently, Kim and Roh (2008) presents further conceptual steps to move
beyond the ACF in a policy network approach. For example, they attempt to predict the
relationship between policy actors based on the proximity of the actors’ policy interests,
resources, and trust. While remaining distance away from an agreed, plausible “theory” of policy
networks, Peterson (2003) notices the level of governance via policy networks in the EU. He
states that public policies are made in policy networks, which is a hybrid arrangement beyond
traditional Weberian hierarchies or pure markets. While investigating the relationships among
the structural features of policy networks, their organizing capacities, and their performance,
Sandström and Carlsson (2008) confirm the explanatory power of policy networks in the
educational policy sector.
As the literature above has shown, integrating policy network approaches into the policy
process theories provide invaluable insights into the policy process and policy outcomes by
allowing for uncovered patterns of political influence and resource flows in policy communities.
Further, the findings contribute to both institutional collectivistic approaches (Powell and
DiMaggio 1991) and variable-based individualistic approaches (most survey-based studies) to
political and policy phenomena. However, most attempts thus far have limited themselves to
using policy networks as a metaphor rather than an empirical substance to analyze based on
4

specific network measures (Wasserman and Faust 1994, Wellman and Berkowitz 1998). Indeed,
little is known from this integrative approach regarding the extent to which the linkages among
policy actors, issues, and events characterize and facilitate the climate policy debate in Congress.
It would be difficult for us to confirm the degree to which congressional debates on climate
change have been framed in particular directions without explicitly examining mobilizing
structures from a policy network perspective.
Research Methods
As stated at the outset of this study, we place our analytic focus on the following two related
inquiries: What were the characteristics of the interconnectedness among the forces that
influenced the climate policy debate including partisan interests, committee jurisdictions, and
sector priorities (or input)? What were the implications of the structural-relational characteristics
of the “policy network” for framing the climate debate and policy outcomes? In answering the
two questions above, first, we used statistical analysis to examine the extent to which the
congressional committees, hearings (issues, objectives), and mobilized sectors were statistically
associated with each other and, second, we used network analysis to map and analyze the
connectedness of the mobilizing structure of political resources.
Data: Source and Nature. The primary data source for this study was the congressional
hearings and the testimonies on climate change. To obtain the records of congressional hearings
and testimonies on climate change, we searched the Lexis-Nexis congressional database with the
keywords of “climate change,” “global warming,” and “greenhouse gases.” The search allowed
us to retrieve the records on 246 hearings and 1,595 testimonies between 1976 and 2007. Each
record on hearing and testimony contained detailed information including hearing title, date,
involved committee(s), topic, summary, witness name, and witness’ affiliation. The records
showed that altogether 21 unique congressional committees were involved in these hearings.
When a committee changed its name during the period, we used its current name (e.g.,
Committee on Science and Technology (1974-1987) → Science, Space, and Technology (19871995) → Science (1995-2007) → Science and Technology (2007-present): Then, “Committee on
Science and Technology”). We classified all 21 committees into proactive (12 committees)
versus inactive (10) types toward climate-related issues based on their levels of activities: A
committee was coded as proactive when it held hearings on climate change regardless of the
party control in Congress. Otherwise, it was coded inactive.
We coded the retrieved records on the hearings as follows: First, each hearing was
classified according to its main objective as “problem definition (PD)” or “solution search (SS)”:
We coded a hearing as PD when its main objective was to define the causes, processes, and
impacts of climate change as a problematic source of environmental risk based on the witnesses’
expertise. We coded a hearing as SS when its main objective was to search for the solutions to
the issues at hand. Second, the hearings were also classified according to their primary foci as
“energy and natural resources.” (e.g., energy production, emission standards, alternative energy
sources), “international climate negotiation” (e.g., ratifying Kyoto Protocol), “economic
consequences” (impacts on the industry), and “climate science” (e.g., scientific evidence).
Additionally, we considered party control (Democratic, Divided, or Republican) in Congress.
Invited witnesses were classified according to the organizations and sectors from which
they came: “Environment-Science”, “Environment-Non-Science”, “Industry-Science”, or
“Industry-Non-Science.” As the literature on the relationship between science and policy
5

indicates, we assumed that the witnesses would attempt to move congressional policy debates in
a direction favorable to their organizations and sectors by representing their collective interests
and interpretations. The authors crosschecked all coding procedure to maximize inter-coder
reliability. Although we based our study in the limited data available inside and outside
Congress, we did not believe that framing climate policy debates would be a function of those
variables and linkages only. For example, several external factors such as scientific discovery,
media coverage, and social, economic, and political events may have played a role in
congressional climate debates. Considering the potential influences of all those forces would
need a separate study. Table 1 below summarizes frequency distributions of the variables used in
analysis.
Hypotheses. In the sections that follow, we test three hypotheses regarding the political
mobilization of climate (scientific, nonscientific) expertise by the congressional committees that
were largely under control of political parties, which sheds light on the nature of framing of
climate policy debates in Congress for the given period.
H1. Congressional committees are more likely to frame global climate change as threatening in
the climate policy debate by holding hearings to define climate-related problems and assess
their negative consequences than by holding hearings to search for the solutions in
Democratic Congresses.
H2. Congressional committees are more likely to frame global climate change as threatening in
the climate policy debate by mobilizing the environmentalist sector than by mobilizing the
non-environmentalist sector in Democratic Congresses.
H3. Congressional committees are more likely to frame global climate change as threatening in
the climate policy debate by mobilizing the science sector than by mobilizing the non-science
sector in Democratic Congresses.
Table 1. Frequency Distribution of Variables of Interest
Party

Committee

Type: Freq (%)

Type: Freq (%)

Hearing
Objective: Freq (%)

Sector
Issue: Freq (%)

Type: Freq (%)

Democratic 14 (0.44)
Divided 8 (0.25)
Republican 10 (0.31)

Proactive 12 (0.57)
Inactive 9 (0.43)

Problem 111 (45.12)
Solution 135 (54.88)

Energy 92 (37.40)
Foreign 54 (21.95)
Impact 23 (9.35)
Science 77 (31.30)

Environment
139 (56.50)
Science 111 (45.12)
Non-Science 28 (11.38)
Industry
107 (43.50)
Science 42 (17.07)
Non-Science 65 (26.42)

32 (100.00)

21 (100.00)

246 (100.00)

246 (100.00)

246 (100.00)

Note: The frequencies of the variable, party indicate years of party domination in Congress.

Findings
In the following two sections, we present our findings, first, on the mobilizing patterns in the
climate policy debates in Congress and their structural characteristics. We discuss the extent to
which the mobilizing patterns among the committees, issues, and sectors potentially facilitated
framing of the climate policy debate across party lines. Second, we statistically test the
relationships among the committees, issues, and sectors for independence and reach the
conclusions regarding the hypotheses on the biased nature of the mobilizing patterns and their
implications for the policy debates.
6

Mapping Mobilizing Patterns in Climate Policy Debates
The first congressional hearing on climate change was held by the Committee on (1)Science and
Technology for the National Climate Program Act in 1976. After that, committees have paid
increasingly more attention on climate change over time, which may reflect more societal
interest in and concerns about climate change (Liu and Vedlitz, forthcoming). Our investigation
shows that the committee involvement in climate change was active only when either party
controlled Congress rather than when Congress was divided: In Democratic Congresses (21
years; 1970s; from late-1980s to early-1990s), committees held on average 7.33 hearings per
year (total 154 hearings) versus 7.90 hearings (total 79 hearings) in Republican Congresses (10
years; from late-1990s to early 2000s). In Congresses when party control was divided (8 years;
early 1980s; early 2000s), only eight committees held, on average, 1.63 hearings per year (total
13 hearings). For a complete list of the committees and the number of hearings that they held
under each party control, refer to Table A in Appendix.
As known, partisan politics is one of the fundamental forces to influence policy debates
(Anderson 2002, Brown 1997, Stallworthy 2009). Thus, we map the mobilizing patterns and
their structural characteristics in the congressional debates separately by the political parties that
controlled Congress. Figures 1 and 3 display the entire networks of expertise mobilization in
Democratic and Republican Congresses, respectively, in which the committees, the issue foci
and objectives on which the committees primarily focused, and the sectors that the committees
primarily mobilized in each hearing. They are followed by the two core networks (Figures 2 and
4) showing the densely connected parts only in each period. Table C in the Appendix
summarizes the key differences between the two mobilizing networks. The period when
Congress was divided is not reported in this section, although our statistical analysis in the
following section includes this period as well.
Comparison shows that the patterns to mobilize climate expertise were substantially
different in structural dimensions between the two Congresses. First, the mobilizing network was
significantly larger in Democratic Congresses (Figure 1) than in Republican Congresses (Figure
3): In Democratic Congresses, 21 committees held 154 hearings (i.e., value sum of the lines
incident to the committees) to discuss climate change issues, whereas only twelve committees
held 79 hearings in Republican Congresses. Even more committees being active in Democratic
Congresses, on average each committee held 3.21 hearings, which was considerably higher than
2.26 hearings in Republican Congresses. Considering the similar numbers of years when each
party dominated Congress when the hearings occurred (11 Democratic versus 10 Republican),
our findings indicate that a significantly larger volume of climate expertise was brought into the
climate policy debate in Democratic Congresses.
Second, as shown in Figure 1, the mobilizing network was more hierarchically organized
around a few committees, issues, objectives, and sectors: After binarizing the line values (0 = no
tie, 1 = ≥1 in Figure 1), the network density was 0.57 (= #ties divided by the #maximum possible
ties), which was substantially lower than 0.73 in Republican Congresses. In Democratic
Congresses, climate debates and expertise mobilization were mostly initiated by a few central
committees including the Committees on (1)Environment and Public Works, (1)Energy and
Natural Resources, (1)Science and Technology, (1)Energy and Commerce, and (1)Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, which held 111 (72.08%) hearings in combination. Nonetheless,
compared to Republican Congresses, there were nine more “inactive” committees that held
hearings only in Democratic Congresses, which may further support the influence of party
7

control in the climate policy debate in Congress. Of those inactive committees, the central
position of the Committee on (0)Energy Independence and Global Warming is particularly
noticeable.
The hierarchy of the mobilizing pattern in Democratic Congresses was also found in the
sectors that the committees preferentially utilized. The committees heavily utilized the
Environment–Science (ENV.SCI) sector, which was a dominant source of climate expertise in 70
(45.45%) hearings in this period. This concentrated pattern is displayed in thicker lines in Figure
1. As displayed, several “inactive” committees also invited witnesses only from this sector.
While societal sectors may have their own collective interpretations of the climate conditions
(Gough and Shackley 2001, Levy and Rothenberg 2002), this concentrated pattern found in
Democratic Congresses may have not allowed competing evidence or oppositional claims to
sustain in the climate policy debate, which in turn may have facilitated the debate and legislation
drafting process.
The densely connected cores (Figures 2 and 4) display the central parts of the mobilizing
structure where the network ingredients are linked through four or more hearings. Focusing on
these cores allows us to observe the typical patterns of expertise mobilization in each Congress.
Figure 2 shows that Committees on (1)Energy and Public Works and (1)Energy and Natural
Resources were deeply embedded in congressional climate debates while working on climate
science issues to define problems and assess impacts (Science.PD) and energy-related issues
(Energy.PD and Energy.SS). The Environment-Science (ENV.SCI) was the dominant source
from which Congress mobilized information. The most typical pattern that characterized this
period is represented as the triangular structures of the committees to address the climate science
issue (Science.PD) with the Environment-Science (ENV.SCI) sector to (i.e., the thick link
between Science.PD and ENV.SCI) and the committees to work on the energy-related issue in
search of solutions (Energy.SS) based on the input from the Industry-Science (IND.SCI) sector
to (i.e., the thick link from IND.SCI to Energy.SS). The committees in this core network played a
significant role in considering major environmental, if not solely climate, regulatory acts such as
NEPA 1970 and Superfund 1980) legislated in Democratic Congresses.
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Figure 1. Mobilizing Network in Congress
Note: 1. (0) = “inactive” versus (1) = “proactive” committees based on their levels of activities under each party control
2. The numbers by the links indicate the frequencies of hearings in which the focal committees invited witnesses from the focal
sectors more than from other sectors (e.g., the link, (1)Natural Resources 3→ Environment–Science shows that the inactive
Committee on (0)Natural Resources invited more witnesses from the Environment–Science sector in three hearings).
3. Network Dimension:
1) Democratic: 21 Committees, 8 Hearing Types, 4 Sectors, and 154 Hearings
2) Republican: 12 Committees, 8 Hearing Types, 4 Sectors, and 79 Hearings

In Republican Congresses, the Committees on (1)Science and Technology, (1)Energy and
Natural Resources, (1)Environment and Public Works, and (1)Oversight and Government
Reform initiated 47 (59.49%) hearings in combination. While all committees that held hearings
in this period were a subset of the committees that appeared in Figure 1, the Committee on
(1)Oversight and Government Reform was the only committee that was more active in this
period. The hierarchy of the mobilizing pattern found in Democratic Congresses was not
noticeable in this period. In addition to the Environment–Science (ENV.SCI) sector that was a
main source of information in 26 (32.91%) hearings, other sectors such as the Industry–Science
(IND.SCI) and Industry–Non_Science (IND.NS) sectors were also actively mobilized. As studies
note, industries have actively responded in their strategies to climate policies in an attempt to
9

negotiate national and international climate change policies (Levy and Egan 1998, Pulver 2007).
Bringing into the policy debate diverse sectors that had ideologically and scientifically diverse
opinions and claims may have allowed counter-claims to construct the “non-problematicity” of
climate change to challenge the global warming claims of mainstream climate science, which in
turn may have created a stalemate in furthering debates and legislation process in any direction
(McCright and Dunlap (2000, 2003).
The diffused mobilizing pattern in Republican Congresses is more noticeable in Figure 4
that shows the core network. Committee on (1)Science and Technology was particularly more
involved in the climate debate to discuss the topics related to energy (Energy.SS), and foreign
(Foreign.SS) issues. Not only the Environment-Science (ENV.SCI) but the Industry-NonScience (IND.NS) sector also provided the debates with a large volume of climate expertise. The
most typical pattern that described this period is displayed as the triangular structures of the
committees working on the climate science issue (Science.PD) with the Environment-Science
(ENV.SCI) (i.e., the thick link between Science.PD and ENV.SCI) and the committees to work
on the energy-related issue in search of solutions (Energy.SS) based on the input from the
Industry-Non-Science (IND.NS) sector (i.e., the thick link between Energy.SS and IND.NS). In
contrast to the Democratic period, no major enactment of climate or even environmental
regulations was made in this period, although climate change surged as a public issue globally as
well as domestically (e.g., Kyoto Protocol 1997).

10

Figure 2. Mobilizing Network: Democratic Core
Note: Five core committees (#hearing ≥ 10) and their links (8 issue foci, 4 sectors)

11

Figure 3. Mobilizing Network: Republican Core
Note: Four core committees (#hearing ≥ 10) and their links (6 issue foci, 4 sectors)

Testing the Bias: Hearings, Sectors, and Parties
Beyond mapping the mobilizing patterns in the climate policy debate in Congress and their
structural characteristics, in this section we statistically test whether or not the climate issues on
which the committees focused and the societal sectors that the committees mobilized differed
depending on the party lines. The conclusions we make later will be based on the evidence from
these two inquiries. As described above, the hearings have been classified according to the
objectives that the committees intended to achieve and the substantive issues. Tables 2 and 3
summarize the climate issues and objectives on which the committees focused under each party
control. Table 2 shows that climate issues addressed in Congress differed across the party lines
(chi2 = 8.0920; Pr > chi2 = 0.044): While energy and natural resources (38.20% of their
hearings) was the issue that drew most attention of the committees, it was addressed mostly by
the committees in Democratic Congresses (42.86%), followed by the issue of science (29.87%).
In contrast, in Republican Congresses, they held more hearings on foreign relations (32.91%)
such as ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and energy-related issues (29.11%). There was no
significant difference in the issues regarding economic impact and science across party control.
12

The objectives that the committees aimed to achieve through the hearings were also
different along the party lines. As Table 3 shows, the committees in Democratic Congresses were
more likely to assess the negative impacts of climate change and subsequently define climate
change as problematic (53.25% of their hearings), whereas those in Republican Congresses,
discuss viable solutions to climate change (74.68%). Although this discrepancy in hearing
objectives may reflect the influences from other contextual forces during the periods when each
party controlled Congress, the findings so far partially support our first hypothesis: we conclude
that congressional committees are more likely to frame climate change as threatening in the
climate policy debate by holding hearings to assess the negative consequences from climate
change and define climate change as threatening than by holding hearings to search for the
solutions in Democratic Congresses.
Table 2. Hearing Issues by Party
Party
Issue

Democratic

Republican

Table 3. Hearing Objectives by Party
Total

66
23
89
Energy
(42.86)
(29.11)
(38.20)
27
26
53
Foreign
(17.53)
(32.91)
(22.75)
15
8
23
Impact
(9.74)
(10.13)
(9.87)
46
22
68
Science
(29.87)
(27.85)
(29.18)
154
79
233
Total
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
Note: Pearson chi2(3) = 8.0920 (Pr = 0.044); Cramer’s V = 0.1864

Party
Objective

Democratic

Republican

82
20
Problem Definition
(53.25)
(25.32)
72
59
Solution Search
(46.75)
(74.68)
159
79
Total
(100.00)
(100.00)
Note: Pearson chi2(1) = 16.5494 (Pr = 0.000);
Cramér's V = 0.2665

Total
102
(43.78)
131
(56.22)
233
(100.00)

Investigating the extent to which climate change was debated in biased conditions in
Congress needs further evidence on the patterns of the committees’ witness selection. Deciding
witnesses to be invited to the hearings is an important political action because climate debates
may proceed in different directions based on the witnesses’ input that often represents collective
positions and interests of the sectors from which they have come. As described in research
methods, the witnesses have been categorized depending on, first, whether they came from the
environment or industry sector and, second, whether they came from the science or non-science
sector. When a witness came from the science sector, the witness was thought to hold scientific
knowledge. As summarized in Table 4, there was significant variation in the patterns of selecting
witnesses depending on the party lines: In Democratic Congresses, for example, committees
invited more witnesses from the environment sector (in 60.39% of their hearings), whereas, in
Republican Congresses, they brought slightly more witnesses from the industry sector (53.16%).
Thus, our findings support the second hypotheses: Congressional committees are more likely to
frame climate change as threatening in the climate policy debate by mobilizing the environment
sector rather than the industry sector in Democratic Congresses.
Utilizing scientific knowledge over non-scientific was also different along the party lines.
In Democratic Congresses, committees invited more witnesses from the science sector (in
64.94% of their hearings) than did those in Republican Congresses. Under Republican control,
invitations were almost evenly divided between scientific and non-scientific knowledge. As
displayed in Figures 1 thru 3 above, when the two criteria to classify sectors were combined, the
“Environment–Science” was the modal sector from which climate expertise was mobilized in
Democratic Congresses, whereas, in Republican Congresses, the “Industry–Non_Science” sector
was as much utilized as the “Environment–Science” sector. Thus, our findings also support the
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third hypothesis: Congressional committees are more likely to frame climate change as
threatening in the climate policy debate by mobilizing the science sector rater than the nonscience sector in Democratic Congresses.
Table 4. Sector Mobilization by Party
Party
Sector

Democratic

Republican

Table 5. Knowledge Mobilization by Party
Total

93
37
130
(60.39)
(46.84)
(55.79)
61
42
103
Industry
(39.61)
(53.16)
(44.21)
154
79
233
Total
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
Note: Pearson chi2(1) = 3.8893 (Pr = 0.049); Cramér's V = 0.1292

Environment

Party
Knowledge

Democratic

Republican

Total

54
39
93
(35.06)
(49.37)
(39.91)
100
40
140
Science
(64.94)
(50.63)
(60.09)
154
79
233
Total
(100.00)
(100.00)
(100.00)
Pearson chi2(1) = 4.4534 (Pr = 0.035); Cramér's V = -0.1383
Non-Science

Compared to the party control, the committees had only a limited influence on the
climate policy debate in Congress. They did not appear to select climate issues to advance policy
agenda and invite witnesses to hear from based on their independent oversight jurisdictions. For
example, a few committees including (1)Energy and Commerce and (1)Oversight and
Government Reform were substantially different in the issue foci, objectives, and sector
utilization: In Democratic Congresses, they were either inactive or working on scientific issues to
define climate change as a problem based on the input from the environmental sector. In
Republican Congresses, they did not exclusively commit themselves to a particular issue,
objective, or sector. Thus, the prevalent evidence indicates a limited role of committee
jurisdictions as far as climate change issues are concerned compared to the party influence. It
was predominantly traditional party lines rather than oversight jurisdictions of the committees
that were instrumental in the climate policy debate for the given period. These findings are only
partially consistent with those by previous studies of the influential role of the committees in
congressional policy debates (Burstein and Bricher 1997, Burstein et al. 1995, Jones et al. 1993).
Nonetheless, our findings also show that a few committees consistently exercised
oversight jurisdiction regardless of the party control. In both Congresses, one the one hand, a few
committees consistently held a large volume of hearings to address climate-related issues: they
include Committees on (1)Science and Technology, (1)Environment and Public Works, and
(1)Energy and Natural Resources. On the other hand, a few committees attended consistently to
specific issues/objectives and sectors, regardless of the party control: For example, of active
committees, the Committees on (1)Commerce, Science, and Transportation, (1)Energy and
Natural Resources, (1)Environment and Public Works, and (1)Science and Technology initiated
hearings similarly.
Discussion
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Appendix
Table A. Party Control and Number of Congressional Hearings on Climate Change
Hearings
(Freq.)

Hearings
(Pct.)

Year

Party Control

1976

Democratic

1

0.4

1979

Democratic

1

0.4

1985

Divided

1

0.4

1986

Divided

1

0.4

1987

Democratic

3

1.2

1988

Democratic

8

3.19

1989

Democratic

21

8.37

1990

Democratic

6

2.39

1991

Democratic

10

3.98

1992

Democratic

10

3.98

1993

Democratic

11

4.38

1994

Democratic

5

1.99

1995

Republican

3

1.2

1996

Republican

4

1.59

1997

Republican

10

3.98

1998

Republican

15

5.98

1999

Republican

9

3.59

2000

Republican

9

3.59

2001

Divided

5

1.99

2002

Divided

6

2.39

2003

Republican

2

0.8

2004

Republican

3

1.2

2005

Republican

10

3.98

2006

Republican

14

5.58

2007

Democratic

83

33.07

251

100.00

Total
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Table B. Congressional Committees: Climate Policy Positions and Hearings by Party
Hearings (Freq.)
Committee

Position
Dem

Agriculture

Div

Rep

Total

Inactive

1

0

0

1

Proactive

3

0

3

6

Appropriations

Inactive

2

1

0

3

Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

Inactive

1

0

0

1

Budget

Inactive

1

0

0

1

Commerce, Science, and Transportation

Proactive

18

1

7

26

Economic

Proactive

1

0

1

2

Inactive

6

0

0

6

Energy and Commerce

Proactive

21

1

6

28

Energy and Natural Resources

Proactive

24

1

11

36

Environment and Public Works

Proactive

29

4

10

43

Foreign Affairs

Proactive

9

0

3

12

Foreign Relations

Proactive

4

0

5

9

Inactive

2

1

0

3

Natural Resources

Proactive

6

1

3

10

Oversight and Government Reform

Proactive

4

0

10

14

Science and Technology

Proactive

22

3

16

41

Small Business

Proactive

1

0

4

5

Small Business and Entrepreneurship

Inactive

1

0

0

1

Transportation and Infrastructure

Inactive

2

0

0

2

Ways and Means

Inactive

1

0

0

1

159

13

79

251

Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry

Energy Independence and Global Warming

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

Total
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Table C. Comparison of Mobilizing Networks by Party
Party Control
Variables

Democratic

Republican

Active
Inactive

21 (100.00)
12 (0.57)
9 (0.43)

12 (100.00)
12 (100.00)
0 (0.00)

# Hearings: Issues
Energy (Natural Resources)
Foreign (e.g., Kyoto Protocol)
Impact (Economic)
Science (R&D)

154 (100.00)
66 (42.86)
27 (17.53)
15 (9.74)
46 (29.87)

79 (100.00)
23 (29.11)
26 (32.91)
8 (10.13)
22 (27.85)

# Hearings: Objectives
Problem Definition
Solution Search

154 (100.00)
82 (53.25)
72 (46.75)

79 (100.00)
20 (25.32)
59 (74.68)

Information: Scientific?
Science
Non-Science

154 (100.00)
100 (0.65)
54 (0.35)

79 (100.00)
40 (0.51)
39 (0.49)

Sectors: Environmental?
Environment
Industry

154 (100.00)
93 (0.60)
61 (0.40)

79 (100.00)
37 (0.47)
42 (0.53)

3.21 (=154/48)
0.57 (=48/84)

2.26 (=79/35)
0.73 (=35/48)

# Committees

Network Density
Valued
Binary

Note: 1. Network density in a valued network = sum of the line values / number of existing lines;
2. Network density in a binary network = number of existing lines / number of maximum possible lines;
3. Network binarized as 0 and 1; 0 if the original line value was 0 and 1 if the original line value was 1 or greater;
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